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Summary and Conclusions
DAILY wages and annual earnings in manufacturing both increased
about 50 percent between 1860 and 1890. The cost of living fluctuated
widely, but the long decline that began in 1865 eventually wiped out
the Civil War increase and restored the buying power of the dollar
to its prewar level, so that real wages and earnings in 1890 were also
50 percent higher than in 1860. Daily wages rose from slightly over
$1.00 in 1860 to slightly over $1.50 in 1890—if we adjust the levels
in both years to the bench marks established by the extensive wage
surveys of the Department of Labor in 1885 and the Dewey-Census
and a number of state labor bureau reports in 1890. Annual earnings
rose from just under $300 in 1860 to just over $425in1890.
Wages in building rose somewhat more—perhaps 60 percent in
money or real terms. Because building employed mostly adult men
in skilled occupations, wages were on a higher absolute level; the
average was approximately $2.75fora ten-hour day in 1890.
The advances have been measured in daily wages, and do not for
the most part take account of extra allowances, premium payments
for overtime, payments in truck instead of in cash, or deductions for
damages and use of tools and materials. But the Weeks Report
questionnaire suggests that these factors could not have changed
the picture materially—at least for the firms reporting.
The data do not take account of the shortening of the average
workday. This reduction seems to have been very small—not more
than 7 percent—bringing the average in 1890 down to ten hours.
The net advance in hourly wages in manufacturing, money or real,
was still not much more than 60 percent, or 1.6 percent compounded
annually, compared with 19 14-53 when the rise was over 5 percent
in money terms and 2.75percentin real terms.' In contrast to recent
data, little or no weight was given to piece-rate earnings, which may
have participated more quickly than time-rate wages in the rising
productivity, or they may even have stimulated productivity increase.
Wage differentials between industries and occupations were large
in the decades between 1860 and 1890; the highest-wage industry
paid two or two and a half times the lowest, and the highest-wage
occupation still more. Adult males typically received three-fourths
1LeoWolman, "Wages in the United States since 1914," Proceedingsofthe Sixth
Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1953, pp. 44-45. The increase
is still smaller compared with the increases found by Wolman for the thirty years
1914-44.
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more than adult females, and two and a half to three times as much as
children and youths. Between regions the differentials were not so
large. Wage levels were low in the South, and high on the Pacific
Coast; but the differentials between the Central states, the Middle
Atlantic states, and the New England states may have been no
greater than among states within these regions.
Wide variations prevailed in differentials among establishments.
Although southern establishments typically paid less than northern
to an adult-male worker of a given skill in a given industry, some
southern establishments paid as much as northern; others more.
Some firms paid more to females than to males in the same occupation.
Regional differentials may have narrowed a bit, but only outside
the South, notably only on the Pacific Coast. Other differentials may
have widened slightly: for occupations, skills, and the sexes. No net
change in wage or earnings differentials or in average dispersion
among industries was apparent, despite the tendency for many
industries with below-average wage levels in 1860 to increase more,
by 1890, than the average.
A fifth of the increase of wages and earnings may have been due
to the relative shift of workers from low-wage soft goods industries
to high-wage hard goods industries—the principal shifts having
been from cotton and woolen textiles to iron and steel rolling mills
and foundries and machine shop products. The data for occupations
are insufficient to tell us what part of the wage increase within in-
dustry may have been due to the relative shift of workers from low-
wage to high-wage occupations. As for the effect of regional move-
ments, it is unlikely that any significant part of the wages or earnings
increase was due to the more rapid growth of employment in the
central and western part of the nation. The Central region, which
had gained the most workers, did not pay average earnings that were
significantly different in 1890 from the average of the southern,
Middle Atlantic, and New England regions, which had had a relative
loss of workers.
Some Concluding Questions
What were the factors responsible for the major movemcnts of wages
and earnings during these years of turbulence and growth?
To begin with, why did wages lag so far behind living costs during
the Civil War—to such an extent that real wages declined more
than a fourth by 1864, and were depressed below prewar levels
until 1867 in building and until 1869 in manufacturing? By contrast,
real wages rose in every full year of World Wars I and II, and
throughout the Korean War. The relative Civil War behavior was
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attributable to both money wages and consumer prices. Money wages
rose less than in World Wars I and II, and only slightly more than in
the Korean War. Consumer prices—especially food, clothing, and
rent—rose much more than in the three later conflicts.
The sluggishness of money wages may perhaps be explained partly
by the fact that unions were far less significant during the Civil
War; partly by the• diversion of the best manpower of the nation
to the armed forces, leaving a less able-bodied and less skilled wage
earner which the mass-production methods of the time were not
able to utilize as effectively as were those of later periods; and finally
by the smaller role played by piece rates and overtime premium pay
during the Civil War, perhaps because cost-plus contracts, which
may place a positive incentive on the payment of premium wage
rates, had not yet come into vogue. On the other hand, it must be
acknowledged that the wage controls—formal or otherwise—were
not the inhibiting factor in the Civil War that they came to be in the
subsequent wars.
The greater rise in living costs may have been due partly to the
absence of price controls, partly to the speculative fever induced by
the issuance of inconvertible greenbacks, and partly to the cutting
off of a large part of the southern agricultural land, thus reducing
supplies of food and cotton. But an important factor in checking
the inflation of later wars was lacking during the Civil War: the
ability of relatively well-off wage earners' families to postpone
consumption of many consumer durables, luxuries, and service
items. The low real incomes at the start of the Civil War must have
made it much less easy to postpone any item of consumption—
since most of the outlay was on necessities. Expenditu.res on food,
clothing, and rent were large percentages of family budgets in the
Civil War years; outlays on services, house furnishings, and mis-
cellaneous luxury items were very small percentages. The worker had
to continue spending for immediate necessities—no matter how high
the price—and this made the price go higher. Indeed, the erosion of
real income by the Civil War inflation made workers less and less
able to postpone consumption as the war progressed, thus accentua-
ting the inflation through desperation buying. The fact that the cost
of living reached its peak in 1865, and began falling immediately
after the Civil War, further indicates that there was no, such backlog
of postponed consumer demand as existed in the three other wars,
when prices continued to rise for several years after the peace.
A second question concerns the role played by productivity.
The time and resources of this study do not make it possible to say
anything definitive on this question. Our own tentative investigations
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indicate that the net increases in real wages and earnings of manu-
facturing workers between 1860 and 1890 are not Inconsistent with
increases in productivity—measured by manufacturing value-added
per worker in constant dollars. Estimates by Gailman disclose
that real value-added per manufacturing worker in the census year
ending May 31, 1890 was 50 percent above that of the year ending
May 31, 1860.2 In comparison, our real annual earnings in manu-
facturing rose 46 percent for all industries and 49 percent for the
17 important industries.
For intermediate years, there was close decade-to-decade associ-
ation between real value-added per worker in manufacturing and
mining, and real annual earnings in manufacturing from the census.
Less close was the association with real daily wages. These rose
while value-added fell in 1860-70, and rose much less than value-
added in 1880-90----thus fluctuating less from decade to decade.
On the other hand, daily wages in manufacturing moved closely
with real output per worker in manufacturing, mining, construction,
and agriculture. The similarity was especially close with the Weeks—
Bulletin 18 series. Real output per worker rose 3 percent between
1860 and 1870 compared with 3 percent for real daily wages; 21
percent between 1870 and 1880, compared with 19 percent for wages;
and 27 percent between 1880 and 1890, compared with 25 percent
for wages.
There is, of course, no necessary relation between short-run
changes in wages and productivity, either in a given industry or in
the economy as a whole. Better grounds exist for expecting that real
wages and productivity would move together in the long run and for
major movements. So large is labor's share of the national income
that any substantial disparity between productivity and real wages
would exert great impact on the other shares—either largely expro-
priating them or presenting them with huge windfalls. Long-term
associations between wages and productivity have been noted by
other observers. Even for the long run the closeness of movement
will depend upon the dates chosen for comparison. The fact that
increases of wages and productivity during these thirty years were
not inconsistent with each other is reassuring, but so imperfect are
the measures of productivity, so complex and manifold the factors
influencing productivity, and so hazy the relation of productivity
to the qualities for which labor must be rewarded economically,
2Robert E. Gaflman, "Commodity Output, 1839-1899," Trends in the American
Economyinthe Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 24 (in press).
Both Galiman and I exclude the hand trades, building occupations, and miscellaneous
agricultural processing industries in certain years. However, Gailman includes non-
precious-metals mining.
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that we leave to later investigation the question of whether the
changes in wages and earnings were fully explained by changes in
productivity during these decades. In any case, what labor manages
to gain depends on its bargaining power. In the absence of strong
unions—to a large extent even with their aid—the ability to convert
rising productivity into real-wage advances will depend on the supply
and demand situation in which labor finds itself.
The period 1860-90 was unquestionably one of great quantitative
increase in labor supply. Total population increased 100 percent,
working-age population 112 percent, and the labor force 120 percent.3
The rise in labor force was relatively modest during the first decade
because of Civil War casualties and curtailed immigration; even so,
the statistics show a one-fourth increase. In each of the next two
decades the increase was approximately one-third. A large share of
the increment was drawn into manufacturing. For the thirty years,
wage earners in manufacturing rose 265 percent, excluding construc-
tion and hand trades, and the increase was especially large during the
Civil War decade. These additions to the number of workers may
have had some offset in a decline in the manufacturing workweek,
but we have seen that it was small.4
Our labor supply data are imperfect, but they do suggest that
quantitative labor supply increased greatly, that it rose very heavily in
manufacturing in all decades, and that much of the increase in
manufacturing employment came during the Civil War decade, in
contrast to a smaller percentage rise in total labor force.
If the increase in quantity of labor supply was large, what of its
quality? There is no over-all measure, but some indication may be
seen in its composition.5 This information is confined to sex and
broad age groups, native or foreign birth, and education.
In the labor force as a whole, the number of females seems to have
increased somewhat more rapidly than the number of males. There
was no breakdown by sex of the labor force for 1860, so that this
appearance of a larger rise for females can apply only to the last
two decades. Even for this period the differential increase for females
was small compared with what has occurred since 1890. In the
manufacturing and mechanical industries, females 16 and older
seem to have increased somewhat less rapidly, and children under
16 much less rapidly, than males 16 and older. However, the death
aForpopulation and labor force: Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945,
Bureau of the Census, 1949, p. 25; Clarence D. Long, The Labor Force under Changing
Income and Employment,PrincetonUniversity Press for the National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1958, Appendix A.
Tables 14 and 13, above.
Long, op. cit.
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and crippling of half a million or more men in the Civil War, and
the postwar disorganization of the southern labor force must count
heavily in assessing the change in quality of the manufacturing work
force between 1860 and 1870.
There remain skill, education, and immigration. No basic statistics
on skill composition exist for these years; the often-repeated argu-
ment that skills were diluted by the mass production factory system
should be greeted with caution since most additions to our factory
labor force were surely drawn from unskilled or semiskilled farm
laborers here and abroad, and the proportion of skilled workers in
or out of manufacturing was probably never large to begin with.
Average education evidenced some increase—judged by the pro-
portion of persons under 20 attending school, plus the continual rise
in days attended by the average student, though the increase was far
less than that which took place after the 1920's.6 As for immigration,
much has been said by others about its influence on earnings, through
its supposed effect in increasing the labor supply and diluting the
quality of that supply. The near stopping of immigration is often
cited as explaining both the narrowing of occupational differentials
and the increase of wages after World War J•7 Although immigration
was relatively less important after the Civil War, it was sufficient
to increase the foreign-born labor force faster than the native labor
force, from a little less than one-fifth of the labor force in 1860 to
a little more than one-fifth in 1890.
All in all, except during the Civil War, the large rise in labor supply
during 1860-90 was not modified by changes in the average quality
of worker. In view of the presumably depressing effect of the in
labor supply, some explanation may be needed as to how increases
in real wages and earnings were possible and why they were so heavily
concentrated in the last decade.
For this we may turn to the quantity of capital per worker in
manufacturing. Like all data of that period, these statistics, based on
decennial censuses of manufactures, leave much to be desired.
Conceptually, capital included the gross assets of the manufacturing
establishments, embracing land, buildings, machinery, actual cash
on hand, raw materials in hand or in process, finished goods on hand,
and unpaid accounts for goods made or delivered. It included
borrowed capital, but excluded rented capital and certain non-
operating capital and intangibles such as securities and loans
6Ibid.
For example, H. M. Douty, "Union Impact on Wage Structures," Proceedings of
the SixthAnnualMeeting, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1953, p. 67.
Douty merely mentions immigration as one factor, however.
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representing investments in other enterprises, copyrights, trade-
marks, and good will.8 The census called for valuation of capital
at the amount carried on the books as of the last day of the previous
year. Depreciation was not requested by the census before 1889;
even as late as 1909, "The great majority of establishments make no
allowances for depreciation on their books and have no definite
idea as to the relation between the original cost or value of the build-
ings and machinery and their present value." Easterlin gives his
opinion that the capital figures presented here are at book value
(principally original cost) with increasing allowance for depreciation
as we move forward in time." This factor would lead to downward
bias in the figures for the later years of the period; on the other hand
the questions addressed by the census through 1880 were vague and
were believed by that agency to overlook items of capital such as
goods in process. Easterlin suggests that the figures for 1870 and 1880
(and presumably 1860) were probably biased downward relative to
those for subsequent years.9 We made two adjustments to the capital
data: one to exclude capital in certain nonmanufacturing industries,
intermittently covered industries, and independent hand trades,
the other to adjust to 1860 dollars, an operation that required some
arbitrary assumptions, in view of the fact that investments were
acquired at various times and prices.
These defects and assumptions keep us from saying anything
final about the causes of wage and productivity increases. Neverthe-
less, the behavior of real capital per worker and wages and pro-
ductivity were highly consistent. Between 1860 and 1890, capital
per wage earner approximately doubled, with the entire increase
apparently concentrated in the 1880's, the decade of the greatest
rise in productivity and real wages. Thus the lag of real wages,
real earnings, and productivity between 1860 and 1880 was probably
due to the dilution of the capital endowment per worker during these
years. Similarly, the doubling of the capital endowment per worker
during the 1880's may have been responsible for so much of the
rise in real wages and productivity being concentrated in that decade.
Undue emphasis should not be placed on quantity of capital.
Fuller understanding is required of its industrial distribution, its
quality, and the techniques by which it is used in production. At
the outbreak of the Civil War, according to Clark, the United
States was probably in advance of other nations in automatic
machinery and interchangeable and standard parts. The Civil War
8RichardA. Easterlin, "Estimates of Manufacturing Activity," Population Redistri-




set higher standards of precision in some industries, created a demand
for laborsaving machinery, and rapidly widened the use of automatic
tools. Railroads were built even in the midst of hostilities. But the
Civil War, Clark felt, did not create new manufactures or revolu-
tionize industrial labor in the North, and it put a heavy burden on
northern industries. In the South, it wrecked or depleted manufactur-
ing equipment and railways, and destroyed the social organization
for economic life, with the result that recovery was unexpectedly
slow.'0 Thus the years of war and reconstruction were periods of
quantitative rather than qualitative progress." These impressions
are consistent with a slow net advance between 1860 and 1870 in
productivity and real wages and earnings.
In contrast, Clark regards 1873-93 as a golden age marked by the
largest opening up of virgin territory and resources of any twenty-
year period in our history, the linking together of transcontinental
railroads, the most rapid application of scientific method to agricul-
ture, large northern investment in southern manufacturing and
railroads, the rise of new manufacturing centers in the South and
West, the spread of technical education through scientific institutes,
and notable improvementsin steel making and railroad construction
and operation.'2 Whether the qualitative advances were high com-
pared with pre-Civil War or more recent periods is not certain, but
the combination of considerable qualitative and quantitative growth
is consistent with the fact that most of the real-wage advance in
these thirty years of American industrial development occurred in
the late 1870's and the 1880's.
The story of wage behavior during 1860-90 would be incomplete
without mention of unions. The period was marked by wide fluctua-
tions in both wages and union activity, by moderate net advance
in both wages and union strength, and by the fact that the 1880's
taken as a decade was the best of the three both for increase of real
wages and development of lasting union organization. Can we trace
connection between these developments in unionization and in wages?
The influence of unions on wages would have been hard enough to
establish if the unions had been well organized and had left abundant
records of their activities. Though the labor movement succeeded in
gaining its first really firm foothold during the last years of this
period, it was, except for the brief candescence of the Knights of
Labor in the mid 1880's, a small part of the work force—typically
10Ourown statistics on manufacturing employment show that the South lagged
behind all the other regions in the increase between 1860 and 1880 (Appendix Table C-2).
Clark,op. cit., pp. 7, 18, 20, 23, 27, 61, 152.
'2Pp. 154, 170, 182, 186.
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1 or 2 percent of the total labor force—or less than 10 percent of the
industrial labor force.'3
Unions made their greatest gains and were probably strongest in
skilled trades; they were surely of almost no significance for laborers.
It would be interesting to investigate whether the large rise of
unionization during the 1880's was associated with any greater wage
gains for the skilled workers than for the unskilled laborers. Later
investigation may yield a more positive result, but no differential
impact of any significance could be noted in our own sketchy examin-
ation of the statistics.
As concerns manufacturing wages, any position that unionization
was a significant factor must be regarded as extremely tenuous.
For the first two decades we have a valuable record of the extent of
union activity in the replies of manufacturing firms to a question
posed by the Weeks investigation made in connection with the 1880
census: "Have strikes or lockouts been frequent in your business ?"
Ofthe 462 firms which supplied wage data, half made no reply to
this question; 169 reported that they had never had a strike or lock-
out since 1860 or since the firm was founded, 58saidthat strikes
were infrequent or rare, and only 3 firms conceded that strikes had
ever resulted in gains to the worker. In the 1880's, unions were
undoubtedly more active in manufacturing, though they were
probably never much of a factor except for some skilled occupations
within some industries.
Any connection between union activity and wages is necessarily
complex. Unions can influence wages, while their own activities are
influenced by wage developments. Their influence can exert itself
through strike activity, inspiration to unorganized workers, conces-
sions by nonunion employers to ward off unionism, or gradual
persuasion of employers that low wages are wrong or unwise. Their
impact can take the form of resistance to reductions, or it can affect
prices and therefore living costs.
These complexities, together with the absence of really adequate
statistics of union membership for the firms and industries covered
by the wage and earnings data, restrain us from trying to assess the
impact of unionization in this period. We could discern no such
impact in our sketchy analysis; but the final judgment on this, as on
some other questions, we leave to later investigation.
Tradeunion membership may have been as much as 14 percent of the industrial
labor force in 1870-72, and it seems to have been about 7.5 percent in 1880 and 8.7
percent in 1890. For union membership, see Lloyd Ulman, The Rise of the National
Trade Union, Harvard University Press, 1955, p. 19.
For industrial employment (including manufacturing, construction, and hand trades)
see Table 14 of this study.
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A Final Word
Despite the quickening in the 1880's, the pace of real wages and
earnings during these three decades of almost unparalleled economic
advance must, by present standards, be regarded as moderate, a
walk followed by a trot, allegretto rather than allegro! This need
not be surprising. A time of rapid economic development out of a
mainly agricultural setting is not necessarily the best for labor.
While industrial demand for labor increases apace, a great reservoir
of labor supply flows into industry as a result of a simultaneously
occurring agricultural revolution. This labor supply does not require
as great a lure of industrial wage increases, since its flow is partly
forced and is still large in relation to the industrial demand. When a
large interfiow of labor supply is added to a great immigration and a
great natural population increase, it is an achievement even to increase
the equipment per worker; qualitative standards are apt to lag.
If this perspective is sound, great quantitative growth would not
necessarily be accompanied by great enhancement in the condition
of labor; such gains must 'probably wait until the most rapid phase of
quantitative growth is over. Then—when the economy can turn its
strength to industrial and social improvement—can begin a golden
age for labor.
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